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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CITIZENS CASUALTY COMP ANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
GEORGE L. HACKETT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case 
No.10334 
BRIEF O,F APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover insurance premiums 
which plaintiff claimed defendant collected and did not 
remit. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
The matter was tried before the Court without jury, 
the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson presiding, on Sep-
tember 29, 1964. The Court rendered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment December 16, 1964, 
in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $4,671.96 plus 
interest from July 29, 1959 (R. 10-16). 
] 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, at the outset of the trial, moved the 
Court to consolidate this case and two companion cases 
currently pending before the same Court involviug the 
same parties, the same type of insurance coverages and, 
in the companion cases, naming two additional would-be 
insureds (R. 32). At the time of that argument, coun-
sel for defendant also moved the Court to dismiss this 
action on the grounds that the same issues of law in this 
action had been adjudicated by a decision of the Third 
District Court, Hon. l\Icnill C. Faux presiding, in the 
companion case, Civil No. 127263, constituting res judi-
cata. This motion does not appear in the transcript be-
cause the reporter did not report the same but indicates 
"argument on motion" (R. 32). Counsel for defend-
ant also, at that time, made reference to the pre-trial 
order which reference is in part reported but not in its 
entirety (R. 32). The gist of argument of counsel for 
defendant relative to the pre-trial order was that the 
undersigned, Gordon A. Madsen, was not present at the 
pre-trial contrary to the language thereof; that he had 
not been retained by the defendant, Hackett, to repre-
sent him in this matter until after the pre-trial; and 
that, in fact, the defendant, Hackett, himself had con-
tacted the pre-trial judge to give him the undersigned's 
name as counsel. The undersigned specifically, at the 
outset of the trial, in connection with the argument that 
the law had been determined in the companion case as 
noted above, reserved as an issue the question of whether 
or not plaintiff corporation was authorized to write the 
2 
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alleged insurance coverage in the State of Utah. The 
Court then indicated it would take the motions under ad-
visement and was pressed by counsel for the defendant 
for an immediate ruling, or in the alternative for leave 
to file an Interlocutory Appeal. The motions were then 
denied, and trial commenced (R. 32 and 33). These mo-
tions were renewed at the conclusion of the evidence and 
again denied (R. 177-8). 
Following the trial and the rendering of the decision 
by the Court as above noted, counsel for defense moved to 
Alter and Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment and moved for a New Trial (R. 17-
21), again in the motions raising the defense, among oth-
Prs, of res judicata (R. 20). Said motions were denied 
by the Court (R. 22). From the orders of the Court at 
the trial, the Judgment, and the Order denying defend-
ant's motions for a New Trial and to Alter and Amend 
defi>ndant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought by plaintiff-respondent, a 
New York corporation engaged in the insurance business, 
before the Third Judicial District Court to compel the 
defendant-appellant to remit to the plaintiff premiums 
for alleged long-haul trucking casualty risks of one Niel-
son Trucking Company in the amount of $9,155.20. Plain-
tiff alleges that these sums were collected by defendant 
and, as plaintiff's agent, defendant should have remitte<l 
the same to plaintiff (R. 1 and 2). Defendant denied 
generally all of the material allegations of plaintiff's 
Complaint and specifically denied that plaintiff was au-
thorized to engage in the insurance business in the Statr 
of Utah (R. 3). 
Some time in October, 1958, the defendant agreed to 
place all insurance needs for Nielson Trucking Com-
pany requested by its president, Paul W. Nielson (R. 
35, R. 94 and 95). Defendant, Mr. Hackett was an insur-
ance broker writing all kinds of casualty and life insur-
ance under the corporate name and style of G. L. Hack-
ett and Company (R. 94). Nielson required, among other 
insurance coverages, public liability and property dam-
age on his fleet of trucks which he operated in several 
western states (R. 35 and 36, R. 95). Defendant, having 
received the order from Nielson, attempted to place this 
coverage ·with plaintiff company and contacted their ge11-
eral agent, Mr. Robert Blum, met with him in Los Ange-
les October 24, 1958, and in a three-party telephone con-
versation with Blum, defendant and a Mr. R. E. Bishop, 
assistant secretary in the home office of plaintiff cor-
poration, plaintiff agreed to write the coverage "pending 
the receipt of a completed signed application on the part 
of Nielson Trucking Co. for their review and considera-
tion." (R. 95-96) Considerable testimony was elicited 
about whether or not the plaintiff company issued "bind-
ers'' at this time. Some of such testimony will be spe-
cifically ref erred to in the body of the argument of this 
Brief. 
Defendant received a deposit premium of $1,000.00 
from Nielson on October 3, 1958, (Exhibit P-1; R. 40) 
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an cl defendant wrote other coverages for Nielson relat-
ing primarily to cargo liability, to bonds, etc. (Exhibits 
P-6, D-7, P-12; R. 37, 65, 70, 85). Considerable discus-
sion and correspondence was had between the def end-
ant and plaintiff's agent, Blum, regarding plaintiff's 
wonld-be coverage which will be treated in detail here-
afh•r (Exhibit D-19; P-15). A document purporting to 
he a policy of insurance, dated April 6, 1959, was at last 
delivered by plaintiff April 7, 1959 (Exhibit P-17). Plain-
tiff cancelled the policy the same date, April 7, 1959 (Ex-
hibit P-16). The notice of cancellation was dated Marcp. 
6, 1959, so plaintiff gave notice of intent to cancel the 
coverage some one month prior to the delivery of the 
policy. Defendant thereafter placed coverage, effectiv~ 
May 1, 1959, with Central Casualty Insurance Company 
(Exhibit P-12; R. 100). 
Nielson Trucking Company in 1960 went into invol-
untary receivership and Exhibit P-12, which constitutes 
a running ledger of Nielson Trucking's account with 
G. L. Hackett and Company, shows a balance due and 
O\\'ing by Nielson in the amount of $3,285.75, for which 
defendant made a claim in the receivership (Exhibit 
P-13). While Exhibit P-12 shows all coverages, bonds, 
etr., written for Nielson, the peculiar type of coverage 
claimed to have been underwritten by the plaintiff and 
actually subsequently carried by Central Casualty in-
surance Co~pany were to have a premium rate com-
puted on a formula derived from the gross receipts 
reported by Nielson. These gross receipt reports were, 
during the course of defendant's dealings with Nielson, 
often tardy, sometimes as much as four months late. Th~ 
premiums paid by Nielson were also delinquent and 
sometimes said premium payment checks were not hon. 
ored at the bank and needed re-processing (Exhibit D-1; 1 
R. 49, 74-5). These payments were unsegregated or un. 
itemized, and were tendered to pay on coverages needed 
by Nielson (excepting some bonds) computed by Nielson 
on gross receipts (R. 72, 76, 65-6). 
While there was considerable testimony introduced 
relative to plaintiff's premium rate, other coverages with 
Fireman's Fund and other insurers,etc., def endant-ap-
pellant maintains that the above constitutes a summary 
of the pertinent facts and will ref er to such other testi- 1 
mony as is incidentally necessary in the course of its 
argument hereafter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
(A) ON THE GROUNDS OF RES JUDI· 
CATA 
The pertinent law, appellant maintains, on this issue 
has been adopted by this court in the following cases: 
Kmght v. Flat Top Mimng Company (1957) 6 Utah 
2d 51, 305 Pac. 2d 503. In that case this Court, in an 
6 
opinion written by Justice Wade, adopted Section 178, 
30 Am. J ur., page 920, as follows: 
"It is a fundamental principle of jurispru-
dence that material facts or questions which 
were in issue in a former action, and were there 
admitted or judicially determined, are conclu-
sively settled by a judgment rendered therein, 
and that such facts or questions become res judi-
ca ta and may not again be litigated in a subse-
quent action between the same parties or their 
privies, regardless of the form the issue may take 
in the subsequent action. • • • '' 
In the later decision of In Re the Town of West 
Jordan (1958) 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 Pac. 2d 105, 106, the 
Court cites additionally and adopts as law 30 Am. Jur., 
Judgments, Section 363: 
''A final judgment on the merits rendered by 
a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive 
as to the rights of the parties and their privies, 
and as to them constitutes an absolute bar to a 
subsequent action involving the same claim, de-
mand, and cause of action. If, however, the two 
suits do not involve the same claim, and cause d 
action, such effect will not be ordinarily given to 
the prior judgment. In this respect, it is worthy 
of notice that there must be not only identity of 
subject matter, but also of the <'ause of action, so 
that a judgment in a former aetion does not oper-
ate as a bar to a subsequent action where the 
cause of action is not the same, although each 
action relates to the same subject matter: • • "~' 
In the same connection this Court held in the case of 
East Millcreek Water Company, et al. v. Salt Lake City 
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(1945 ), 108 Utah 315, 159 Pac. 2d 863, 866: [and more 
recently repeated in the cases of vVheadon v. Pearson 
(1962), 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 Pac. 2d 946, 947, with empha-
sis supplied as follows:] 
'' * * * there are two kinds of cases where thr 
doctrine of res judicata is appliPd: In the one tlie 
former action is an absolute bar to the maintr-
nance of the second; it usually bars the success-
ful party as well as the loser; it must be hetwrcn 
the same parties or their privi2s; it applies nnl 
only to points and issues which are actuallu raisr1 
and derided therein but also to such as cn11ld have 
been therein adjudicated, but it only applies ·where 
the claim, demand or cause of action is the same 
in both cases. In such case the courts holn that 
the parties should litigate their entire claim, dr-
mand and cause of action, and every part, iss11~ 
and ground thereof and, if one of the parties fail~ 
to raise any point or issue or to litigate any part 
of his claim, demand or cause of action and the 
matter .~(oes to final jrnlgment, such party may not 
a~ain litigate that claim, (lemarnl or cause of ac-
tion or an>-· i:;;sue, point or part thNcnf "-hirh he 
could ha,·e hnt failed to litigate in the formr•r 
acti(ln. On the other ha11d where tlw e1aim, 1lt'-
mand or carn;e of action is <liffrr0nt in th0 hrn 
cases then tlic• formE>r is res jmlirata of fhe htt·.'!' 
onl~.- to the extent that the former nctuall>-· rai:;;ed 
and decided the same points and issues which arr 
raised in the latter." (Cases cited) 
The appe1lant herein maintains that a prior and 
companion case involving the same two litigants had 
reached a final judgment in District Court resolving the 
pertinent issues of fact before the Court here and such 
judgment did, in fact, therefore, constitute res judicata. 
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The case to which appellant makes reference and the per-
tinent extracts therefrom which appellant wishes this 
Court to take judicial notice of pursuant to Section 
78-25-1 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is Citizens Cas-
ualty C omp(11)1,y of New York v. Keith J. Coons and George 
Hackett, Third District Court, Civil No.127263. That case 
went to trial January 15, 1962, Judge Merrill C. Faux pre-
siding. Following the trial the Court entered its Finrl-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment on the 
17th of April, 1962. The Court there found in Findings 
9, 10 and 11 as follows : 
"!1. PJaintiff contended that a binder was is-
sued by plaintiff. But there was no evidence of 
such an insurance binder having been issued by 
plaintiff, and it was not shown that plaintiff had 
ever granted to defendant, George Hackett, au-
thority to bind the plaintiff on insurance risks. 
10. The polic~r in question was form No. 380 
C-3-58. This form had never been filed with the 
office of the Utah State Insurance Commissioner, 
as required by 31-19-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
11. The purported insurance policy bore the 
counter-signature of one R. E. Bishop, who is a 
resident of the state of New York. It was stipu-
lated by the parties that the said R. E. Bishop 
has never been licensed in any capacity by the in-
surance Commissioner of the state of Utah." 
In its Conclusions of Law the Court found: 
'' 1. No contract of insurance ever became ef-
fective and plaintiff is not, therefore, entitled to 
collect a premium. 
3. Defendant, George L. Hackett, is entitled to 
judgment against plaintiff; no cause of action." 
Counsel for plaintiff in that action then filed a Mo-
tion for New Trial. Said Motion has never been argued 
or disposed of and the Court's Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Judgment therefore constitute a 
binding and final adjudication in the matter. 
Appellant wishes to point out here that not only were 
the same parties before the Court in the Coons case, the : 
same issues of law and fact were there presented with 
two incidental exceptions: 
1. Co-defendant, Keith J. Coons was also made a 
party in the former action while the alleged insured in 
this action was not named as a party defendant, and 
2. The insurance policy form in the Coons case 
was numbered 380 C-3-58, while the policy in this case 
bears the form number of 582-1-56. Appellant further, 
however, requests this Court to take judicial notice of 
the certificate supplementally filed herein by the State In-
surance Commissioner which indicates that neither of 
pursuant to Section 78-25-1 (3) and in accordance with 
the office of the State Insurance Commissioner. Appel· 
lant requests this Court to take such notice of this pub· 
lie record from the Insurance Commissioner's office both 
pursuant to Section 78-25-1 (3) and in accordance with 
its holding in American Fork Irrigation Company v. 
Linke, (1951) 121 Utah 90, 239 Pac. 2d 188. 
Appellant therefore contends that whether or not 
1 
the Coons case, this present case and a third action 1 
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brought by the plaintiff against this defendant antl an-
other co-defendant, could and should have been consoli-
dated, the above cited law is determinative and the per-
tinent issues of fact that are controlling here had already 
been finally adjudicated. As noted in the above State-
ment of Facts, defendant at the outset of the trial moved 
to dismiss on this ground and it was reversable error 
on the part of the Trial Court to deny said motion. 
(B) ON THE JURISDICTIONAL GROUND 
THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NO STAND-
ING IN COURT. 
Section 31-19-9 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides as follows : 
"(1) No insurance policy form, other than a 
surety bond form or application form, where writ-
ten application is required, or rider form, per-
aining thereto shall be issued, delivered, or used 
unless it has been filed with and approved by the 
commissioner.'' 
Appleman, in his extensive treatise on insurance law 
and practice, Volume 19, Section 10531, with reference 
to compliance by foreign insurers with regulatory stat-
utes in the insurance field says the following: 
"It has been held by a very substantial num-
ber of cases that a policy issued by an insurer 
which has not been admitted to do business within 
a state, or which is issued by it prior to receiv-
ing a certificate of authority, is absolutely void. 
Such contracts have been considered unlawful. 
And a similar result of unenforceability has at-
tached to policies solicited or written by agents 
who have not complied with the state laws. 
11 
''The better rule would seem to be that such 
contracts are held void so far as the insurer is 
concerned, and the courts will not permit the in-
surer to maintain an action based upon such an 
unlawful contract .... '' pp. 218-219 
'' ... No recovery can be had by an unlicensed 
insurer upon premium notes, or for premiums, 
dues, or assessments, even though the collection 
of such assessment is sought by the company's 
receiver. And a foreign insurer which was not 
licensed but which was doing business within th~ 
state could not have a release of a trust deed 
wrongfully made by its agent set aside. 
''Such an insurer has also been denied the 
right to recover upon the note or bond of a local 
agent. Other cases, feeling this result a bit clrns-
tic, have reached a contrary result, particular]:' 
where the only failure of the company ·was to 
publish a periodical report. Of course, in a11y 
event, the persons pa3Ting such premiums to the 
agent ·would retain a right of action to recon'r 
them hack, so tbe more drastic result would not 
mean that the agent could pocket such preminms 
with impunity." pp. 220-222. 
''The weight of recent authority is to the rf-
f ed that the iiisurance company cannot, itself, rely 
either upon its own Jack of authority or violation 
of law as a defense to an action upon an insnr· 
ance contract, or upon a lack of authorit3T or Yio-
lation of law hv its agents. The courts are nnt 
prone to penali~e an insured, ignorant of the co~­
pany 's lack of authority, for the company's mis-
conduct, or to deprive him of the protection for 
which he has paid. Nor is such a policyholder con-
sidered to he in pari delicto with the company or 
its agents.'' pp. 224-226 
12 
The Texas case of Denton v. Ware, (1949) 228 S.W. 
2d 867, 871 announced that view in the following lan-
gunge: 
"It is true that, as the prerequisite to the 
right to engage in the insurance business or the 
right of foreign insurance companies to do busi-
ness in this state, the statutes requiring charters 
and permits must be complied with, but these 
statutes are for the protection of the citizens of 
the state who may deal with such companies. It 
is also true that such companies and their agents 
are subject to penalties if the statutes are violated 
and it is generally held that they cannot enforce 
collection of premiums by suit; but when they have 
collected such premiums and delivered policies of 
insurance, those insured under them are entitled 
to recover on the policies in the event they incur 
the losses against which they are insured." (Em-
phasis added) 
See also Home Forum Ben. Order v. Jones, 20 Tex. 
Civ. App. 68, 48 S.W. 219: Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
GaTveston, H. & S. A. Railway Co., Tex. Com. App., 239 
s.w. 919. 
The South Carolina case of Ballentine v. Covington 
(1918), 96 S.E. 92 is one where a foreign insurance com-
pany whose selling agent in South Carolina had failed to 
comply with some qualifying insurance statutes, took 
promissory notes as payments for premiums on a policy 
written with the foreign insurance company. The Court 
refused to permit collection on the promissory notes. The 
opinion reads in part: 
''The contract of insurance was made in vio-
lation of law, and this court ·will not lend its aid to 
13 
enforce a contract made in violation of law. The 
object of the insurance statutes are not for rev-
enue only, but to protect the public from fraud 
and imposition and not to allow unfit and im-
proper persons to solicit insurance for companies 
whose solvency is doubtful and the persons in-
sured are not getting the protection paid for. In 
this case we will leave the parties where we find 
them, and decline to enforce the contract.'' 
Also in accord is the Minnesota case of SeamMtS v. 
Christian Brothers Mill Co., Minn. (1896), 66 Minn. 205, 
68 N.W. 1065, 1066. In this case a receiver of an in-
solvent Wisconsin Mutual Insurance Company sought to 
recover premiums from a Minnesota corporation in a 
Minnesota court. It was held that non-compliance with 
Minnesota insurance statutes regulating insurers pre-
cluded recovery. The court said: 
"But, as before stated, it depends on the laws 
and public policy of such state whether or not it 
will thus enforce the contract. The laws and pub-
lic policy may be such as to destroy this comity 
and prohibit such enforcement of the contract. 
We are of the opinion that the laws and public 
policy of this state in reference to the insuring of 
property are of this character. The restrictions 
in our statutes are so many, and the repressive 
character of the legislation such, that we must 
hold this to be the public policy of this state. This 
seems also to be the character of the insurance 
legislation in Iowa and Michigan, as appears ~y 
the cases of Seamans v. Zimmerman (Iowa), o9 
N.W. 290, and Seamans v. Temple Co. (Mich.), 
63 N.W. 408, where this same receiver was de-
feated in attempts to collect unpaid premiu~s 
from citizens of those states. . . Neither is this 
14 
decision in conflict with Ganser v. Insurance Co., 
34 Minn. 372, 25 N.W. 943, where it was held that 
the insured can recover the loss even though the 
insurer has not complied with the statutory re-
quirements so as to be authorized to do business 
in this state. The very object of these statutory 
provisions is the protection of the insured, and 
the parties are not in pari delicto. '' 
The plaintiff herein, in its own Complaint, at para-
graph 3, appears to admit that it did not have the author-
ity to underwrite the coverage in question but affirma-
tively alleges 
''The Utah Commissioner of Insurance did not 
recognize the limited purpose for which the de-
fendant was appointed, namely - for countersign-
ing purposes and the plaintiff was obliged to sup-
port the coverage for the Nielsen Trucking Com-
pany (R. 1). 
In view of the Coons case noted above and further in 
view of plaintiff's failure to comply with Section 31-19-9 
as evidenced by the certificate of the Insurance Commis-
sioner supplementally filed herein, this plaintiff is not 
entitled to use the Utah courts to collect its would-be 
premiums. 
POINT 2 
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO SUPPORT 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IN THAT 
NO CONTRACT OF INSURANCE WAS EVER 
CONSUMMATED GIVING RISE TO A CAUSE 
OF ACTION. 
On the issue of the existence of an insurance con-
tract, plaintiff having called the defendant as his wit-
15 
ness on direct examination, proposed the following ques-
tions and received the following answers: 
'' Q. And in that connection did you contact 
the Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, the Plain-
tiff in this action? 
A. Contacting their general agent Mr. Rob. 
ert Blum. 
Q. And after contacting him did you receive am 
communications like a telegram. or letter fro~ 
Citizens Casualty Company of New York? 
A. I did. 
Q. Will you produce those communications? 
A. Yes. 
Your Honor, I must have that in another file. 
MR. MADSEN : Here. 
A. Thanks. No, I didn't issue the binders. 
They would happen, Mr. Arnovitz. I flew to Los 
Angeles and met with their general agent of 
10-24-58. Mr. Blum and in a three-way conver-
sation between him and with myself listening on 
the line to Mr. R. M. Bishop at the home office in 
New York. Mr. Bishop as a resuJt of that tele-
phone call, which I paid for, and the receipt of 
which is right here, caused a wire to be sent to 
our office in. Salt Lake City, saying that they would 
bind the coverage pending receipt of the complet-
ed signed application on the part of Nielson 
Trucking Co. for their review and consideration. 
Q. I see. And did you send in that application! 
A. Airmail, special delivery from Los Angeles, 
yes, sir." (R. 95-6) 
There was considerable discussion subsequently be· 
tween plaintiff's representatives and defendant about 
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1d1ether plaintiff could take the coverage and if so, at 
what premium, the first of these being as follows: 
A. And after that application went in and 
binders had been sent, then what did you do about 
collecting premiums on that policy? 
A. I didn't do anything about collecting pre-
miums on that policy, because the company had 
not advised us what their rate would be, but on 
deposit of the rate that we had with Nielson pend-
ing receipt of the premium to be charged by com-
pany, we waited for their information on what 
those rates would be and receipt of a policy. They 
had to formulate the rates in New York. I had 
nothing to do with that. (R. 96-7) 
He was later asked about conversations had with 
plaintiff or its officers, etc., in connection with arriving 
at an agreeable premium and he responded that there 
were ''many'' conversations. 
'' Q. Did you have any other subsequent con-
versations with either Mr. Bishop or any agent 
of the company in New York? 
A. Many. 
Q. And what were those conversations relat-
ed to? 
A. Why we hadn't received the policy, why we 
hadn't had communication and why we hadn't 
been advised what the rate was and when we 
could expect the policy. 
Q. Did you have any conversation or conver-
sations with Mr. Blum? 
A. I did." (R. 157-158) 
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Two letters were introduced, marked Exhibits 
"P-15" (from Bishop) and "D-19" (from Blum), which 
provided in their pertinent paragraphs respectively a8 
follows: 
"The only other item to be cleared is the Ne[]. 
son Trucking Company. This matter was held in 
abeyanre pending a discussion with 1\fr. Blum be-
cause of the change in our reinsurance farilities 
for the primary layer. Sinre this market has 
evaporated it would be our intention to issue the 
policy at the manual rate of approximately $4.84 
and then permit your office time to replace the 
coverage so that we could terminate our filings on 
this account also. About all we could do is to re-
iterate the importance of clearing these matters 
up promptly." (Exhibit "P-15") 
"The Citizens have not yet produced this pol-
icy and I am becoming conrerned berause of thr 
time lapse and the premium that is due. I havr 
not heard further from them but I wonder if you 
would be kind enough to photostat the old Mid. 
Union policy and send it to me and I will send it 
to them, ~sking one more time for them to issue 
this rontract. I do not understand this situation 
but needless to say, it upsets me. $15,000 pre· 
miums with no policy become a matter of worry 
and in my case, disgust." (Exhibit "P-19") 
On cross-examination by his own rounscl, the following 
exchange occurred. 
By Mn. MADSEN: 
Q. Did Citizens Casualty Compan~T ever send 
vou a bill or a statement for this polic~T which \\'!IS 
delivered April 7, 1959~ 
A. Never. 
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Q. Either before or after the delivery of the 
policy? 
A. No. 
Q. Well, the :first contact you had in the way 
of billing for said policy is that which you received 
from Mr. Nordby of Nielson Trucking after they 
billed Nielson? 
A. Yes. (R. 150) 
Later in connection with the Bishop letter (Exhibit 
P-15) : 
Q. Was this the :first comment relating to rate 
other than the agreed upon three dollar and some 
rate that you had in your phone conversation as of 
October previously? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this letter as of February they're still 
indicating some question in their mind as to what 
rate, if any, they are going to charge ; is that 
correct¥ 
A. Yes. (R. 160) 
And further : 
Q. Now, then, Mr. Hackett, have you - I be-
lieve you have already testified to this, but I am 
not now sure. Did they ever, Citizens Casualty, 
the Plaintiff here, ever submit a statement to you 
as to what premiums you should be collecting on 
this policy during any of this time period? 
A. Never. (R. 161) 
Finally: 
'' Q. Then you say the policy in question was 
in fact issued April 7th, 1959? 
A. The 6th. 
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Q. Had yon in fact notified Citizens of the can .. 
cellation of the policy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. In what manner? 
A. I called him long distance phone and told 1 
them of the absence of any policy, in spiL, of om ! 
repeated effects [efforts] to obtain this policy that · 
I had sought the aclYice of legal counsel a~ tn 
what to do, because after all we had to produce 
a policy and we hadn't yet had one and upon the 
lawyer advising me, checking \vith the state, they 
found in fact they could not issue such a policy, 
they had never made their filings and that was the 
reason why we hadn't received the policy. 
Q. "\Vithout telling us what was said or not 
were you in fact contacting the State Insurancr 
Commissioner regarding this specific policy or 
proposed coverage? 
A. I was. 
Q. Arnl is this what led to yonr phoning as yon 
just related? 
A. Y cs." (R. 160-61) 
Moreover, the record is explicit on the question as to 
whether or not the defen<lant was or had been acting as 
plaintiff's agent. His testimon~' in that connection was 
uncontroverted : 
Q. Did they ever give you a contract in agency, 
appointing you their agent? 
A. No. 
Q. ·vv ere you acting as their agent or an inde· 
pendent hroker as and when you made the cover· 
age. When you talked to Mr. Blum were you act· 
ing as agent in the sense of a general agent 1 
20 
A. At the time I talked to Mr. Blum, I was 
acting as independent broker. (R. 161-2) 
In this area appellant maintains the applicable lflw 
is found in 29 Am. Jur. 587 at Section 196 and reads as 
follows: 
"It is no doubt true, however, that where there 
is simply an offer to insure, ·without acceptance, or 
where anything is left open for future adjustment 
as to amount or duration of risk, or as to pre-
miums, no contract to insure exists. It must clear-
ly appear that all the elements essential to a valid 
contract are agreed upon. There must be an off er 
m1d acceptance of a complete contract to insure." 
(Emphasis added) 
This vie"· ·was adopted in the recent California case of 
Vyn v. N ortl11cest Casualty Co., et al. (1960, 301 Pac. 2d 
869, 872. There, the court said: 
"In Byrne v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 
'.\[ o., 88 S.W. 2d 344, 346, the court said: 'WhHe a 
contract of insurance has some features which dis-
tinguish it from an ordinary commercial ~ontract, 
yet in general respects it is like any other eon-
tract and is governed by the same rules.' 32 C. J. 
p. 1091. It is essential to the making of a con-
tract of insurance as it is to any other contract 
that there be 'an agreement, or meeting- of the 
minds of the parties' thereto. 32 C. J. p. 1095." 
See also TT' estcrn Ass11r. Co. v. life.Al pin, 23 Ind. App. 
220, 5!) N.E. 119, 77 Am. St. Rep. 423; Mallard Y. Hard-
ware ludP.m. Ins. Co., (Tex. Civil App.) 216 S.W. 2d 263. 
There was clearly, from the above testimony no 
"meeting of minds'' between plaintiff and defendant on 
21 
the essential element of premium to be charged. In thui 
connection, the defendant testified that the monies re-
ceived from Nielson were carried on two ledgers entitJ0rJ 
"note account" and "open account." 
Q. And that your own books carried this ac-
count as an open account and a note account; ii 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you applied all of those receipts on sub-
sequent insurance or concurrent insurance then 
in force; is that correct? 
A. Yes. (R. 163) 
And again: 
Q. And in that instance you did not so an-
swer, but your testimony today is that those funds ' 
as they were received were kept in open account 
and applied on insurance coverages you wrote 
for Nielson Trucking Company? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Less your commissions~ 
A. Yes. (R. 164) 
There being no agency expressly granted to defend-
ant as noted above and there being no finalized contract 
of insurance ever consummated, plaintiff has no cause 
of action on which to base a suit for premiums and the 
Trial Court erred in :finding to the contrary. 
POINT 3 
DURING THE PERIOD IN ISSUE THERE ' 
WAS NO EVIDENCE SHOWING ANY LOSS I 
i 
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SUSTAINED, CLAIM MADE OR BENE],IT 
PAID UNDER THE WOULD-BE POLICY AND 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAS A LIABIL-
ITY TO REFUND THE PREMIUM TO THE 
WOULD-BE INSURED RATHER THAN rrHE 
PLAINTIFF. 
An annotation found at 29 A.L.R. 2d 171 collects the 
rather numerous cases dealing with the liability of an 
insurance agent to the insured with respect to procure-
ment, contents, terms and coverages of insurance policies. 
At pages 203 and 204, in the annotation, the cases rela-
tive to damages are collected and indicate that where in 
fact the would-be insured suffers no loss or makes no 
claim pursuant to the supposed policy, the insured's 
damages are limited to the premium paid. This view is 
adopted in Am. J ur. at 29 Am. J ur. Insurance, page 562, 
paragraph 163, as follows : 
''As to the measure of liability of an insurance 
agent or broker for his f aiure to procure insur-
ance, where a loss is suffered by the intending in-
sured, the rule is that the damages should be equal 
to the amount that would have been due under 
the policy provided it had been obtained. How-
ever, where no loss occurs, the measure of dam-
ages is the amount palid as the premium." (Em-
phasis added) 
Our own insurance code adopts this view at Sec-
tion 31-19-24 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
am.ended: 
''No person shall willfully or negligently fail to 
return to the person entitled thereto, within a rea-
sonable length of time, any sum collected as pre-
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mium for insurance in excess of the amount ac-
tually spent for insurance applicable to the subject 
on account of which the premium was collected." 
(Emphasis added) 
The record is absent any evidence showing that any 
loss was sustained during the purported time period of 
October, 1958, to April, 1959, that plaintiff claims cover-
age was extended. It was equally absent any evidenre 
of claims made by Nielson Trucking Company pursuant 
to any policy of insurance. 
The record is, on the other hand, clear that Nielson 
retained defendant to obtain and keep in effect all in-
surance coverages needed by Nielson, and defendant 
so attempted to do. In fact, the record discloses that all 
monies received by defendant from Nielson Trucking 
Company were in fact ultimately applied on insurance 
coverages with companies other than the plaintiff. 
Q. And that in fact as the coverage continued 
and the relationship with Nielson continued, these 
coverages were paid for and all of the money rr-
ceived from you was in fact applied on insnrance 
coverage? 
A. Right. 
Q. Based upon policies which were in fact in 
effect? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All others than Citizens Casualty? 
A. Yes. (R. 166) 
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Counsel for plaintiff on re-direct examination further 
inquired into the matter as follows: 
Q. If Your Honor will indulge me just a mo-
ment - Are you holding any funds in trust for 
the Plaintiff as a result of the issuance of this 
policy, Mr. Hackett? 
A. No. 
Q. Would you tell us what disposition was made 
of the funds you collected from Mr. Neilson? 
A. They apply as set forth in the letter. 
Q. In other words, the funds that were paid on 
the policy of the Citizens Casualty Company, you 
applied on the policy of the Central Casualty 
Company? 
A. Right. (R. 176) 
As noted in the Statement of Facts above, at the ter-
mination of defendant's dealings with Nielson Trucking 
Compau>' tlef endant had in fact expended some $3,000.00 
more on insurance coverage than Nielson paid for and 
was compelled to file a claim for said amount with the 
receiver of Nielson Trucking Company. 
In summary, the plaintiff in this action arrived at a 
premium purportedly due it by inference. That is, it 
sought to show (A) the total money paid by Nielson to 
defendant, (B) to estimate the premium allocable to 
other coverages in force during the time period in ques-
tion, and (C) to demand that the balance of A minus B 
was due the plaintiff as its "earned premium." There 
is no evidence in the record showing any computation on 
the part of plaintiff of its proposed rate or premium due 
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or earned other than Exhbit "P-15" quoted in Point 2 
above, wherein plaintiff's officer quoted a figure rather 
tentatively. Considered in view of the law cited above 
not only does the defendant not have a duty to remit 
anything to plaintiff but likewise, pursuant to the statute 
above quoted, has a liability to refund to Nielson any 
premium paid which did not purchase insurance cover· 
ages. Appellant, of course, maintains that all premiums 
paid by Nielson did purchase insurance coverages as the 
testimony above indicates. But, for the purpose of 
argument of this point, it wishes to illustrate that dur. 
ing the time period defendant attempted to get cover· 
age by the plaintiff, defendant himself was personally 
and considerably exposed by way of liability to Nielson. 
That is, had Nielson experienced a loss, having turned 
all of his insurance matters over to the defendant, Niel· 
son could have held defendant personally responsible and 
plaintiff, of course, could have claimed no policy in force 
since none had been delivered and since a premium had 
never been agreed upon. Now, however, there being no 
loss, no risk or no claim made, plaintiff is a J ohnny-com.e· 
lately wishing in this action to obtain would-be premiums 
having never assumed any actual risk. 
POINT 4 
THE ALLEGED BINDER WAS INVALID 
BECAUSE NO POLICY WAS DELIVERED 
WITHIN 150 DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVE 
DATE. 
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Section 31-19-21 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, provides : 
''No binder shall be valid beyond the issuance 
of the policy as to which it was given or beyond 
150 days from its effective date, whichever period 
is shorter.'' 
Exhibit "P-17," the alleged policy in question, 
shows on its face that notwithstanding it was to be a 
12-month policy, it covers a period from October 27th, 
1958, to April 7th, 1959, and it also shows on its face 
that it was counter-signed at Salt Lake City, April 6th, 
1959, by one R. E. Bishop. (As noted heretofore, l\fr. 
Bishop is not a qualified resident agent for plaintiff com-
pany and did not, in fact, sign the document in Salt Lake 
City.) Simple arithmetic shows that the effective date, 
being October 27th, 1958, is 162 days from the issuance 
date of the policy April 6th, 1959. 
Accordingly, whatever binder, if any, plaintiff may 
have issued, the same became ineffective or expired be-
fore any policy came into being. 
POINT 5 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE 
PRE-TRIAL ORDER SO NARROWLY AS TO 
RELIEVE THE PLAINTIFF OF ITS BUR-
DEN OF PROOF RAISED BY THE PLEAD-
INGS. 
The Pre-Trial Order in this action (R. 5), which 
appellant maintains is inconsistent on its face, states: 
"At the time of pretrial it was stipulated that 
the pleadings formed the issues in this matter. 
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The sole issue is whether or not the def endaut 
has misappropriated certain moneys to which the 
plaintiff claims it is entitled to.'' (R. 5) 
As noted heretofore, the undersigned first entered 
an appearance on behalf of the defendant at the time 6f 
trial, notwithstanding language in the Pre-Trial Order 
that the undersigned was present at the Pre-Trial; and, 
as also indicated heretofore, the undersigned, at the out-
set of the trial, referred to the inconsistency of said Pre-
Trial Order and moved that the issues in fact be broad-
ened sufficiently to include all those raised by the plead-
ings. The Trial Court, however, as indicated by the 
Memorandum Decision and later by the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, restricted the trial 
to one issue as follows : 
'' 1. That the plaintiff is an insurance corpora-
tion of the State of New York and has a Certificate 
of Authority from the State of Utah to transact 
within the State of Utah the business of property, 
marine and transportation and general casualty, 
excepting glass and surety insurance; that the 
Pretrial Order did not make any issue as to plain-
tiff's authority to transact insurance business in 
the State of Utah; that the sole issue stated in 
the Pretrial Order is whether or not the def end· 
ant has misappropriated monies to which the 
plaintiff claims it is entitled to." (R. 10) 
By so narrowly construing the issue the Court there-
fore assumed that an agency existed between defendant 
and plaintiff. It further assumed that plaintiff had the 
authority to underwrite the coverage in question in the 
State of Utah. And it further apparently ass11mPd to 
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be true the allegations of paragraph 3 of the Complaint 
wherein plaintiff complains that sanctions were imposed 
on it by the Utah Insurance Commission compelling it 
to assume such coverage. All of these matters were e.x-
pressly denied by the Answer and, in fact, formed as 
issues by the pleadings. 
While Exhibit "P-14" indicates that some initial tele-
grams to the Utah Public Service Commission and Inter-
state Commerce Commission, reputed to be binders, were 
sent in October, 1958, by plaintiff, there is no evidence of 
any dealings by the plaintiff with the Staie Insurance 
Commissioner. Such narrow construction by the Court 
Q>f the issues obviously constituted prejudicial error in 
that all the issues above noted were expressly raised by 
defendant's Answer and properly, therefore, framed by 
the pleadings. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant-appellant, for the foregoing reasons, does 
therefore respectfully move that this Court reverse the 
Judgment of the court below and remand the case with 
instructions that the same be dismissed or that, in the 
alternative, a new trial be had. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
MABEY, RoNNOW, MADSEN & MARSDEN 
57 4 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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Attorneys for Defendant-· 
Appellant 
